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Abstract: - Law enforcement agencies (LEA) constantly seek new cross-border processes and technical 
solutions that would facilitate their combat against international organized crime. This paper studies how new 
types of satellite-based tracking sensors, mobile monitoring stations and their associated communication 
channels for LEA can be understood and designed taking into account the chain-of-custody and monitoring-of-
legality requirements. The empirical data was collected within four research projects in 2007-2014. The 
theoretical framework is built on the design theory of software-intensive systems. For improving law 
enforcement processes, the three main functions (crime investigation, chain-of-custody and monitoring-of-
legality) should be considered all at once. Comprising their separate information systems will avoid triplicate 
workload. It also will enable multiple other benefits, such as transparency of surveillance and giving a new tool 
for commonly agreeing of the balance between surveillance and privacy. 
 
Key-Words: - Chain-of-custody requirements, Crime Investigation, Global navigation satellite systems, Law 
enforcement, Law enforcement authority, Monitoring-of-legality, Software intensive systems, Technical 
tracking. 
 
1 Introduction 
Due to the economic situation, the main need of law 
enforcement agencies (LEAs) is to maintain their 
core services with significantly reduced budgets. 
This means that they need new innovations and 
automation equipment for routine tasks. Also, all 
information and communication technology (ICT) 
systems should have long life-time and new systems 
should be interoperable with old ones.  
A Global navigation satellite system (GNSS) 
based sensors and systems benefits LEAs when 
tracking non-cooperative targets. However, 
management of numerous electronic tracking 
devices within many simultaneous crime 
investigations has proven to be a demanding task for 
LEAs. Complications have spawned many lawsuits 
and negative publicity. These episodes have 
diminished citizens’ trust in a constitutional state. It 
has been verified by the means of participative 
observations that LEAs have a tendency to create 
two level systems: others work on the streets; others 
are valid at the Courts of Justice. Some European 
countries are well on the way towards this phase of 
development. The importance of transparency is 
emphasized within all EU administrative levels. 
However, LEAs concentrate only on data 
acquisition instead of making their operations 
transparent all down the line. Because of privacy 
protection of suspects, crime investigations and 
LEAs’ data capture cannot be public. However, they 
could be so transparent that the critic and control 
made by citizens is possible to come true in respect 
of state authorities. 
The European Commission has announced 
Horizon 2020, an €80 billion programme for 
investment in research and innovation. Horizon 
2020 brings together all EU research and innovation 
funding under a single programme. It focuses on 
turning scientific breakthroughs into innovative 
products and services that provide business 
opportunities and change people’s lives for the 
better. For the EU’s secure societies challenges, the 
research priorities of the Horizon 2020 are about 
protecting European citizens, society and economy, 
assets, infrastructures and services, while not 
forgetting prosperity, political stability and well-
being either. Organized crime and mobile organized 
crime groups are still considered to be some of the 
major challenges for the EU internal security to 
address. One of the key research areas in the secure 
societies theme of the Horizon 2020 is to fight 
against crime and terrorism. The research topic 
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FCT-05-2014 [1] concerns itself with novel 
monitoring systems and miniaturized sensors that 
improve LEAs’ evidence-gathering abilities: 
Investigations on the activities of criminal 
organizations usually require Law Enforcement 
Agencies (LEAs) to use electronic equipment for 
legal recording, retrieving and monitoring of 
criminal activities in a safe and unnoticed way, 
while keeping for both the sensors part and the 
monitoring station all the legal, integrity and chain-
of-custody requirements that will enable the 
presentation of evidences obtained this way at the 
Courts of Justice. 
Requirements for this equipment are very 
different from those offered by available 
commercial devices. Depending on the operation, 
the periods of time that these electronic devices 
have to work can range from days to months or in 
real time. Access to the device could be limited or 
impossible. Secure remote operation over radio 
channel (or other type of communication channel, 
including GSM networks) should be possible. Other 
requirement may apply like small size for easy 
concealment, low power consumption for extended 
time life, robustness and self- protection in addition 
to strong authentication mechanisms for operators 
and protection of the communication channels. 
This paper collects together research results from 
four different research projects with regard to 
tracking of non-cooperative targets. The main 
research question is: How new types of satellite-
based tracking sensors, mobile monitoring stations 
and their associated communication channels for LE 
operations can be understood and designed taking 
into account the chain-of-custody and monitoring-
of-legality requirements? 
 
2 Theoretical Framework 
A global navigation satellite system (GNSS) based 
sensors and systems are very useful for law 
enforcement when tracking non-cooperative targets. 
Nowadays, law enforcement relies on and finds new 
uses for GNSS technology to assist in investigating 
crime and gathering evidence. LEAs ought to have 
forensics technology for investigations and field 
work. These kinds of technologies include advanced 
tracking systems that apply GNSS technology to 
track criminals and vehicles that have been tagged. 
This allows LEAs to keep track of suspicious 
activity and can help solve cases. 
A GNSS-based tracking system for law 
enforcement is a complex system of systems. It 
consists of different socio-digital software-intensive 
systems, such as law enforcement, GNSS-based 
tracking systems, communication systems, and 
command, control & intelligence systems. For 
improving law enforcement, also, different 
functions are needed, such as crime investigation, 
chain-of-custody and monitoring-of-legality. All 
these systems and sub-systems have many 
stakeholders with different requirements.  
As the theoretical foundation of this study, the 
science of design for software-intensive system 
(SIS) towards new GNSS-based tracking system for 
improved law enforcement is proposed. A system 
can be defined generally as a collection of elements 
that work together to form a coherent whole, and 
SIS are systems in which some, but not necessarily 
all, of the component elements are realized in 
software [2]. 
 
2.1   Designing of Software-intensive Systems 
Theory of complex systems traces its roots to the 
60’s when Simon wrote his book “Science of the 
Artificial” [3]. Fulfillment of purpose involves a 
relation between the artifact, its environment, and a 
purpose or goal. Alternatively, it can be view as the 
interaction of an inner environment (internal 
mechanism), an outer environment (conditions for 
goal attainment), and the interface between the two. 
The real nature of the artifact is the interface [2]. 
Both the inner and outer environments are 
abstracted away. The science of the artificial 
complex systems should focus on the interface, the 
same way design focuses on the “functioning.” A 
general theory of complex systems must refer to a 
theory of hierarchy, and the near-decomposability 
property simplifies both the behavior of a complex 
system and its description [2].  
Revolutionary advances in hardware, 
networking, information, and human interface 
technologies require new ways of thinking about 
how software-intensive systems (SIS) are 
conceptualized, built, and evaluated. Manual 
methods of software and systems engineering must 
be replaced by computational automation that will 
transform the field into a true scientific and 
engineering discipline [2]. The vision of science of 
design research for SIS should achieve the 
following essential objectives [2]: 
1) Intellectual amplification: Research must extend 
the human capabilities (cognitive and social) of 
designers to imagine and realize large-scale, 
complex software-intensive systems. 
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2) Span of control: Research must revolutionize 
techniques for the management and control of 
complex software-intensive systems through 
development, operations, and adaptation. 
3) Value generation: Research must create value 
and have broad impacts for human society via the 
science and engineering of complex software-
intensive systems and technologies. 
Fig. 1 illustrates the three layers of SIS: (1) the 
platform layer, (2) the software layer, and (3) the 
human layer. Also, the two critical interfaces are 
shown. 
Human layer
Software layer
Platform layer
SW-Platform interface
Human-SW interface
 
Fig. 1 Software-intensive systems layers  
 
SIS design entails many important decisions such 
as the design and allocation of system behaviors 
(e.g., functions, actions) and system qualities (e.g., 
performance, security, reliability) to the different 
layers [2]. A particular system activity could be 
realized in hardware (platform), via e.g. a service 
call (software), by human behavior (human), or 
some combination of activities across all three 
layers, and a performance requirement (e.g., 
response time) for a SIS transaction could be 
divided and allocated as performance requirements 
in each of the layers. Nearly all future SIS will be 
connected to environmental resources and other 
systems via network connections and these 
connections lead to complex systems-of-systems 
architectures for providing behaviors and qualities 
[2]. There will be identifiable networks across all 
three SIS layers: physical networks support the 
transmission of digital and analog data among 
system platforms, software networks provide the 
middleware layers and protocols that transform the 
transmitted data into information that is shared 
among the information processing systems, and 
social networks provide a means of interaction and 
community among the human participants of the 
complex system [4]. 
2.2   Law Enforcement Technology Services 
In the last two decades, modern technologies have 
become an inseparable part of our lives. 
Technologies facilitate our daily lives and nowadays 
it is not even possible to imagine that we can 
manage without them. Unfortunately, technologies 
facilitate daily lives not only of upstanding citizens, 
but of the organized crime, as well. Regrettably, 
organized crime often has wider possibilities to use 
the technological achievements than LEAs. 
However, in order to improve their evidence-
gathering abilities, LEAs are constantly seeking new 
technological recording, information retrieval and 
monitoring solutions that would facilitate their 
combat against criminal organizations. The 
criminals’ countermeasure activities, such as 
electronic counter-surveillance, jamming and 
constant changes in behavior to prevent 
eavesdropping or physical surveillance are 
continuously increasing [5]. The pressure to find 
new intelligent technologies, which are harder to 
detect, more strongly encrypted, longer-lasting, 
quicker to install and more adaptive, is emerging 
and is a high-priority task. Respecting the 
accountability and integrity requirements and 
smooth utilization of data in different phases of 
chains-of-custody is of utmost importance. In the 
current situation, the chain-of-custody is difficult to 
maintain due to different techniques that run on their 
own and are connected to different monitoring 
systems. This makes the LEA work very labor-
intensive, so the use of new state-of-the-art 
technologies should enable the optimization of the 
use of human resources [6]. 
When LEAs are working in order to prevent and 
investigate crimes, some of the operations affect 
privacy of citizens. Video surveillance, audio 
surveillance and technical tracking are among those 
activities. Already in 2006, BBC News [7] listed 
some of the possible means for surveillance and 
tracking: CCTV cameras, automatic number plate 
recognition, radio frequency ID tags in shops, 
mobile phone triangulation, store loyalty cards, 
credit card transactions, satellites, electoral roll, 
national health service patients records, personal 
video recorders, phone-tapping, bugs and hidden 
cameras, worker call monitoring and cookies. Only 
LEAs can legally use the information from all these 
sources. In addition to using gathered data LEAs 
share information with other authorities. European 
integration has increased transport of illegal goods 
and criminals. Therefore, transmitting, tracking and 
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other status information between nations and 
different organizations is becoming everyday 
business. For example, LEAs are using more 
tracking technology than ever before. The systems 
are network-based (GSM&TCP/IP) and they can 
transmit information basically anywhere. These 
days, technical tracking is used in even nominal 
cases [8]. 
Seeking to fight against organized crime, the EU 
should keep up with the development of technology. 
The EU should use all the benefits of the modern 
technologies in order to fight against criminal 
activities and promote cooperation among the EU 
Member States. In order to implement the desired 
goals, the European Network of Law Enforcement 
Technology Services (ENLETS) was established as 
a sub-group of the Law Enforcement Working Party 
of the EU Council in 2008. The main goal of this 
sub-group is to strengthen police activities and 
cooperation and increase the use of modern 
technologies in the process of exchanging 
information, knowledge or experience. Another goal 
of ENLETS is to develop a common single platform 
for the delegates of the EU Member States for 
information exchange. One contact person in every 
EU member country will be responsible for 
collecting information on the technological needs 
and for presenting those needs to ENLETS. This 
platform is necessary for the experts from the LEAs 
in order to share the news about the technology 
market and advice on the use of technologies in 
daily life of any officer. The primary goal is to use 
one common platform of ENLETS, which would be 
available for every EU member country, and in this 
way to avoid duplications of different systems 
which have already been used by some EU member 
countries. It is not a secret that technologies are 
quite expensive. For that reason, ENLETS is also 
trying to find possible financial solutions, 
concerning the implementation of technologies in 
the field of law enforcement. The new vision and 
mission for ENLETS are [9]: 
Vision: The European Network of Law 
Enforcement Technology Services will be the 
leading European platform that strengthens 
police cooperation and bridges the gap between 
the users and providers of law enforcement 
technology. 
Mission: ENLETS supports front line policing 
and the fight against serious and organized 
crime by gathering user requirements, scanning 
and raising awareness of new technology and 
best practices, benchmarking and giving advice. 
It is active in joint initiatives, sharing 
information and networking between law 
enforcement agencies, industry and research 
organizations. It is a point of contact to access 
European law enforcement technical 
organizations. 
ENLETS realizes its mission by co-operating on 
three levels/steps: (1) sharing of best practices, (2) 
co-creation of new technology services, and (3) 
research. Sharing of best practices that enables 
quick wins on the Europol Platform of Experts 
(EPE) is the most important task and priority of 
ENLETS [9]. Examples of shared best practices 
include: automatic number plate recognition, IT 
systems (open source and signals), tools for cross-
border surveillance, and remote stopping of 
vehicles. The next step of ENLETS’ technology 
scope is co-creation based on missing requirements 
within best practices. This step includes sharing 
(inter)national projects, such as biometrics, fraud 
identification, and covert surveillance multisensory 
tools (e.g. high-quality long-distance listening tools 
with chain-of-custody and privacy enhanced 
technology). These technology developments should 
be based on operational priorities with a short-to-
market approach (1-2 years), industry being the 
developer. The third level of ENLES technology 
scope is the needed research that is not always in 
line with requirements. This is mainly carried out by 
the core group members of ENLETS that include 
The Netherlands, The U.K., Finland, Belgium, 
Poland and the EU’s presidency country. ENLETS’ 
role is to feed end-users’ needs to EU research 
programmes, such as Horizon 2020. The new 
funding instruments ‘pre operational validation’ and 
‘pre commercial procurement’ are good initiatives 
in Horizon 2020 [9]. 
 
2.3 GNSS-based Tracking Systems for Law 
Enforcement 
A GNSS is a satellite navigation system with global 
coverage. GNSS-based navigation has become part 
of daily life. Timing, orientation, positioning and 
navigation are deeply embedded in the lives of 
everyone. The use of GNSS is still growing—a 
recent market research report predicts that the 
GNSS market will likely double by 2016 [10]. At 
the moment, only the U.S. NAVSTAR Global 
Positioning System (GPS) and the Russian 
GLONASS are global operational GNSSs. China is 
expanding its regional Beidou navigation system 
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into the global Compass navigation system by 2020. 
The EU’s Galileo positioning system is a GNSS in 
its initial deployment phase. The European 
Commission launched its first two operational 
satellites in October 2011, and the Galileo system is 
scheduled to be fully operational by 2020 at the 
earliest. 
The actual GNSSs vary, but generally they 
consist of three major segments: the space segment, 
the positioning equipment segment, and the control 
segment. For example, the space segment of GPS 
consists of a system of 24 space-based satellites, of 
which three are spares. The GPS satellite orbital 
radius is 26,561.7 km and each satellite has a 12-
hour orbit. Precise time is provided by a redundant 
system of rubidium and/or cesium atomic clock 
boards for the space vehicle. Each GPS satellite is 
capable of continuously transmitting L1 and L2 
signals (L1 = 1575.42 MHz and L2 = 1227.6 MHz) 
for navigation and timing, and L3 signal for nuclear 
detonation data [11]. It is also capable of receiving 
commands and data from the master control station, 
and da-ta from remote antennas via S-band 
transmissions. 
In general, the GNSS receiver compares the time 
a signal was transmitted by a satellite with the time 
it was received. The time difference, along with the 
location of the satellites, allows the receiver to 
determine the user location. Signals from a 
minimum of four different satellites are required to 
determine the three-dimensional position. The 
receiver usually consists of an antenna assembly, 
radio frequency (RF) receiver, data processor, 
control/display unit, power supply, and interface 
unit [11]. 
The control segment commands, uploads system 
and control data to, monitors the health of, and 
tracks the space vehicle to validate ephemeris data. 
The control segment of GPS consists of a master 
control station located at Colorado Springs, five 
remote monitor stations which are located in 
Hawaii, Ascension Island, Diego Garcia, Kwajalein, 
and Colorado Springs, three ground antennas which 
are located at Ascension Island, Diego Garcia, and 
Kwajalein and a Pre-Launch Compatibility Station, 
which can also function as a ground antenna, 
located at Cape Canaveral [11]. 
 
2.4   Communication Systems 
Telecommunications technologies have an 
important role within tracking systems: the 
communication segment delivers positioning data 
for post-processing and, further, to end-users. In 
most cases, the tracking device sends positioning 
data via mobile networks. The Internet or other 
networks are used to route positioning data from 
mobile networks for post processing, and this makes 
the system globally available. End-users can access 
their data via multiple different communication 
networks, as well [12]. 
Information security threats include different 
kinds of threats at different levels. Delivery of an 
SMS is encrypted only on the radio interface. An 
SMS is delivered without encryption in the core 
network and even between operators. GPRS offers 
data encryption only on the radio interface, whereas 
data is delivered without encryption in the core 
network. 3G information security is built on GSM 
security, adding many new security features. 
However, 3G has security problems: e.g. the 
International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) is 
sent in clear text when allocating a Temporary 
Mobile Subscriber Identity (TMSI) to the user. The 
transmission of the International Mobile Equipment 
Identity (IMEI) is not protected; hijacking of 
outgoing/incoming calls in networks with disabled 
encryption is possible. On the Internet, data is not 
encrypted as default. Unsecured and sensitive data 
can therefore be a potential target for the hackers 
and criminals. 
In cross-border tracking operations, data is 
transferred via multiple telecom operators’ 
networks. Normally, data is not encrypted in 
operators’ core networks. Globally there are many 
different operators with different information 
security practices, so the end-user cannot rely on 
data being delivered safely. Data can be protected 
by establishing secure tunneling between the client 
and a data processing center or it can be encrypted 
before sending by using Secure Hash Algorithms 
(SHA) such as SHA-256, SHA-384, or SHA-512. 
By secure tunneling, data transfer can be made as 
secure as the chosen encryption method. The most 
common tunneling technique is IP Secure 
Architecture (IP-sec). In many cross-border 
operations, not a single public safety organization 
can work alone. Hence, co-operation is extremely 
critical between actors. The working parties should 
not simply trust and rely on their own resources. 
Regardless, only a few organizations possess all the 
required areas of expertise in a large-scale incident 
or disaster. Information sharing and education at the 
organizational level is required in order to achieve a 
working relationship between the actors. This 
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requires actual and operational interoperability 
between the first responding organizations; also in 
reality and in the field – not only in the form of an 
official agreement but in a much larger scale [13]. 
With respect to European mission-critical public 
safety communications, TETRA or TETRAPOL is 
widely used and recommended. There are no other 
improved standards available at the moment. Data 
transmission over TETRA is rather slow and will 
not satisfy future needs. However, it is extremely 
reliable, regardless of its low capacity 
communication. Wideband data (TETRA Enhanced 
Data Services - TEDS) is an effort for improved 
data services, but TEDS falls short to current and 
future needs. However, a dedicated broadband 
public safety mobile data network independent of 
public mobile networks may not be available in 
Europe until 2020. The current situation needs 
complementary technologies in addition to TETRA. 
Research suggests that multichannel 
communications would solve the problem. There is 
a global demand for safe and secure multichannel 
communications, and it is expanding day by day 
[14]. 
All centralized solutions are vulnerable to many 
threats that include deni-al-of-service (DoS) attacks, 
system failures, repudiation, spoofing, tampering. 
Wherefore, decentralized modular communication 
and information management systems should be 
used; if one part goes down, other part works. Also, 
turning the services on a single operator is a risk. 
Utilizing parallel connections of multiple operators 
ensures connectivity, minimizes risks and 
maximizes reliability. Tracking applications need 
secure seamless wireless communication solutions 
with selectable level of quality-of-service (QoS) and 
wide coverage areas. Even though publically 
available wireless services usually provide 
reasonable coverage under acceptable cost 
conditions, most of the public providers do not offer 
any data service with a guaranteed QoS level. The 
principal improvement of QoS can be arrived at by 
the selection of the best possible alternatives from 
the set of currently identified available services, or 
by applying multiple communications systems 
parallel. The distributed systems 
intercommunication protocol (DSiP) allows the use 
of several parallel communication paths 
simultaneously, handles communication channel 
selection and hides link establishment issues from 
devices and/or software that wish to communicate 
with each other using the DSiP solution [15]. 
Efficient decision processes must be adopted to 
reach the relevant QoS. Success of such approach 
relies on a profound understanding of applied 
technologies and their performance described by 
their performance indicators. DSiP router’s QoS 
option sets the desired order of the network access 
by desired cost-of-service (CoS) value [16]. 
 
2.5   Command & Control and Intelligence 
Most new digital services for the public safety 
sector are supplied via stand-alone systems without 
in-built interoperability. There is a real lack of a 
coherent system that would coordinate the various 
technologies, and improves the system’s accuracy 
and usability. According to Frost and Sullivan study 
[17], the need for interoperability between services 
is the key market driver with regard to first 
responders’ communications, command and control, 
and the intelligence (C3I) market. The main market 
restraints are fragmented decision-making and 
budgetary allocations [17].  
Remote operation means the control and 
operation of a system or equipment from a remote 
location. In systems engineering, monitoring means 
a process within a distributed system for collecting 
and storing state data. A LE monitoring station is a 
workstation or place in which sensor information 
accumulates for end-users who need it. Monitoring 
systems include information gathering, analyzing 
and providing for end-users, which is front-
deployed-knowledge. At present, many LEAs are 
still using point-to-point investigation tools and 
tracking systems, where the information is 
transmitted from the sensor to e.g. a laptop of the 
surveillance team for monitoring. These old-
fashioned stand-alone systems create neither 
watermarks nor log file marks; the system only 
retrieves the information and stores it locally. For 
that reason, neither chain-of-custody nor social 
acceptance by transparency comes true. 
Many LEAs have no case officer resources in 
their control and command room (CCR) to observe 
on 24/7-basis the information that sensors are 
producing. Some countries have a server-based 
centralized system based on CCRs with dispatch 
capabilities. These systems have capabilities to send 
orders (tasks) and to receive reports. When the 
number of sensors grows, this procedure is 
problematic. If you are not involved in the case and 
do not have deep knowledge about the context, it is 
very difficult to identify what behavior is normal 
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and what is interesting or alarming, and hence 
important points can go unnoticed. 
The end-user is not always the one actually 
controlling the sensor. In many cases, equipment is 
planted by technicians and not by LEAs who are 
using it. In most cases, the control of the sensor is 
far from optimal. There are several cases where the 
sharp-end equipment is running flat out and using its 
batteries when no-one is watching the information 
in real time, and the density of the information is not 
needed [5]. It is like running a car on a motorway in 
the first gear instead of sixth. The existing 
monitoring systems are developed for case-officers. 
There is a need to take into thorough consideration 
the organizational and procedural interoperability 
for example, by explaining how the prosecutors and 
courts can have access to the system and to the 
evidence. 
Essential parts of transparent LEA operations are 
strong authentication mechanisms and a 
provisioning system that enables the sensor to work 
only when it has permission from the central legal 
audit server. Unfortunately, an open, standardized 
provisioning system for multimedia covert 
investigation tools and tracking devices is missing. 
 
2.6   Conclusions of Theoretical Framework 
Fig. 2 summarizes the content of the review of the 
literature adopting the software-intensive system 
layers approach. There has been a gigantic shift 
from a hardware product based economy to one 
based on software and services. This has also been 
the fact with regard to law enforcement. For 
example, the ICT systems of a typical police vehicle 
already cost about the half of the costs of a new 
vehicle [18]. From every indication, the growth of 
the software layer, in size and percentage all of the 
overall systems will be the future trend. The 
software layer is a makeup of software code, 
information, and control within the context of an 
application domain. “The overlaps among these 
three concepts support varying methods and 
techniques of understanding and building the 
software layer of systems. For example, software 
architectures define structures for integrating the 
concept of code, information, and control for a 
particular application domain system” [2].  
In a future world of pervasive computing and 
ubiquitous cyber-physical devices it is essential that 
IT artifacts and the integrated systems containing 
these artifacts are reliable, adaptable, and 
sustainable. Design for SIS should draw its 
foundations from multiple research disciplines and 
paradigms in order to effectively address a wide 
range of system challenges. The most important 
intellectual drivers of future science of design in SIS 
research will be dealing with complexity, 
composition, and control [2] 
Human 
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Platform 
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Human 
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Software 
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Platform 
Layer
Human 
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Control & 
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Fig. 2 Summary of literature review from SIS point of 
view 
3 Results 
3.1   Understanding GNSS for Law Enforcement 
The major challenges that LEAs confront when 
using tracking equipment in crime investigations 
and preventions are [19]: (1) commercial GNSS 
sensors do not fulfil the needs of LEAs, (2) cross-
border operations are problematic because criminal 
nature has internationalized but LEAs are national 
organizations, (3) secure mobile communications 
should be available worldwide, energy efficient and 
invisible for suspects, (4) investigation data should 
fulfil chain-of-custody requirements, and (5) LEAs 
operations should have societal acceptance and 
monitoring-of-legality.  
Utilizing of artificial intelligence and machine 
type learning, the functional quality and energy 
consumptions of tracking sensors could be improved 
in many ways. Because the battery is the biggest 
component of GNSS-sensors, this means that the 
size of the sensors could be made smaller without 
functional compromises. 
LEAs as well as their preventive and forensic 
tracking, audio-visual and other type of sensors need 
global cyber secure communication channels. These 
communication needs could be fulfilled by a 
distributed system applying multiple simultaneous 
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access technologies and communication paths. 
Taking into account interoperability with existing 
systems and economic issues, this communication 
system could be realized in conjunction with other 
public safety and critical infrastructure protection 
actors, such as military, fire and rescue services, 
emergency medical services, energy management, 
water supply and sewerage. 
LEAs’ present-day ICT systems do not support 
cross-border cooperation. In addition to these 
technical challenges, the distrust between LE 
organizations is a tall order. Unfortunately, this 
distrust exists also at national level, and even 
between units of one organization. On the other 
hand, common ICT systems and operational 
procedures could increase the trust between parties. 
ENLETS’ vision is to be the leading European 
platform that strengthens police cooperation and 
bridges the gap between the users and providers of 
law enforcement technology. The core group 
members of ENLETS should develop common 
procedures to apply new LE technology.  In future, 
these procedures could be extended to other 
European countries as well as towards applying 
older LE technologies. 
 
3.2 Model for Future Law Enforcement 
Intelligence System 
  
Communication
System
Command,
Control &
Intelligence
GNSS
Law Enforcement
Fig. 3 SIS model for law enforcement tracking systems 
 
Fig. 3 shows a model for LE satellite-based 
tracking systems and demonstrates the identifiable 
networks across all three SIS layers of the different 
systems. Before Galileo is operational, the control 
of GNSSs is totally outside of European LEAs’ 
hands. Also, communication systems are controlled 
via telecom operators. However, applying DSiP 
system enables LEA to act as a virtual telecom 
operator. 
 
Fig. 4 Multi-use of law enforcement sensor data 
 
Fig. 4 presents the principle of multi-use of law 
enforcement crime investigation and forensic sensor 
data that could be a part of the command, control 
and intelligence system of law enforcement. 
Integrating crime investigations, chain-of-custody 
and monitoring-of-legality into the same system of 
software-intensive systems gives many advantages. 
One of the key strands of integrated criminal 
prevention policy starts with multi-use of relevant 
information across sectors and borders, boosting the 
effectiveness and cost-efficiency of law 
enforcement activity. Currently however, EU and 
national law enforcement and other public 
authorities are responsible for different 
functionalities of criminal preventions. A political, 
cultural, legal and technical environment should be 
created for enabling information sharing and multi-
use between existing and future criminal 
investigation, chain-on-custody and monitoring-of-
legality systems. The system should ensure data 
security, especially information integrity and 
authenticity. It is also evident that the state 
authorities require some sort of institutionalized and 
standardized procedure in order to accept and trust 
the system. In addition, informal systems are needed 
to support the formal ones in order to survive the 
present social and political situation. According to 
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the conventional wisdom, trust is critical in such 
multi-use systems and procedures. 
 
4 Discussions 
Organized crime is a real cross-border threat with 
the emergence of international warehouses of crime. 
For improving their evidence-gathering abilities, 
LEAs are constantly seeking new technological 
recording, retrieving and monitoring solutions that 
would facilitate their combat against criminal 
organizations. The criminals’ counter-measure 
activities, such as electronic counter-surveillance, 
jamming and constant changes in behavior for 
preventing eavesdropping or physical surveillance 
are continuously increasing. The pressure to find 
new intelligent technologies, which are harder to 
detect, more strongly encrypted, longer-lasting, 
quicker to install and more adaptive, is emerging 
and is a high-priority task. The study of Rajamäki 
and Kämppi [20] provides an improved 
understanding of the structural characteristics and 
dynamic evolution of mobile communication 
challenges to cross-border satellite-based tracking 
operations carried out by LEAs. Especially 
machine-to-machine (M2M) communication in 
cross-border covert operations needs much more 
researched. 
When preventing and investigating crimes, LEAs 
perform a variety of activities that affect the privacy 
of civilians. Video surveillance, audio surveillance, 
technical monitoring and tracking are among few to 
mention amongst many other activities. On various 
incidents, law enforcement is seeking more control 
rights, which increases concern amongst citizens 
and also the level of open debate increases steeply. 
Most of earlier studies were concentrated either to 
privacy issues from the citizens’ point of view or on 
developing new forensic technologies for LEAs. 
Instead, Rajamäki et al. [19] provide an improved 
understanding about why transparency is a crucial 
factor for success in LEAs’ technical surveillance. 
This paper also presents examples of current 
technological possibilities to create transparent and 
plausible monitoring for surveillance activities. 
Trust in LEAs has always been high in Finland. 
Nevertheless, there are a number of people in 
society who do not have any confidence in 
authorities, especially in police forces and their 
extended control. However, there is empirical and 
factual evidence pointing to that civilians are willing 
to give extended rights to authorities in extremely 
necessary situations. In such cases, people are more 
open and expecting authentic and timely 
information.  
LEAs apply new technology in very effective 
ways. However, at worst, LEAs must perform many 
stages twice with the help of different technical 
tools [6]. When investigating the identity of 
criminals, LEAs may apply totally different 
technical tools than when gathering evidences for 
charge, because the data provided by their 
investigations may not be valid in court. For that 
reason, new tools that go beyond the state of the art 
are needed. Three organizational layers need 
attention: (1) LEA; the people that actually retrieve 
and store the information, (2) Prosecutors and their 
offices; how they get access to the information and, 
(3) Courts; the final destination of the retrieved 
information. Until now, the information gathering 
tools for LEAs have been engineered focusing only 
on the best way to retrieve information from the 
target. The attention paid to the legal, integrity and 
chain-of-custody requirements, and to social 
acceptance and monitoring-of-legality in connection 
with retrieving information has been inadequate, 
and guidance on the matters has existed only in 
manuals written by legal departments [6]. 
Much research exists in the field of public safety 
communications (PSC). The requirements of 
broadband data transmission are similar for public 
protection and disaster relief, critical infrastructure 
protection and military [21]. A fully decentralized 
PSC architecture concept that uses the Distributed 
Systems inter-communication Protocol (DSiP) can 
fulfill these requirements [14]. Here, network actors 
and elements are identified and authenticated by 
establishing physical connection. This concept also 
recommends group level user-authorization 
mechanism for each participating organization. 
Their respective users of command and control 
rooms were identified, authorized and authenticated 
to various data sources. The concept will be highly 
fault-tolerant in routine as well as crises operations. 
The software-based approach will be independent of 
heterogeneous data communication technologies, IP 
networks and telecommunication operator services. 
The solution will enable the building of an effective 
and lasting cyber-secure data network for multi-
organizational environment. Being a fully 
decentralized concept, networks of individual 
member organizations will be virtually autonomous 
and unlikely to upset each other. That will allow 
smooth message and information exchange to 
enable interoperability. 
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5 Conclusions 
For improving law enforcement, different functions 
are needed, such as crime investigation, chain-of-
custody and monitoring-of-legality. All these 
systems and sub-systems have many stakeholders 
with different requirements. Modular approach 
(sensors, monitoring systems, communications) 
means that new technologies are easy to apply and 
new types of sensors could be easily included to the 
system. Integration of (1) investigation data, (2) 
digital evidence (=chain-of-custody requirements) 
and (3) monitoring-of-legality into the same system 
of SIS has multiple benefits for many stakeholders, 
and no duplicate work is needed. Table 1 
summarizes the main stakeholder needs and benefits 
of new types of GNSS-sensors, (mobile) monitoring 
stations and their associated communication 
channels for LEA operation on the field taking into 
account the chain-of-custody requirements and the 
societal acceptance of these solutions. 
TABLE I  Stakeholders and their 
needs/benefits 
Stakeholder Needs/benefits 
Citizens Transparency of surveillance.  
Balance between surveillance and privacy.  
Efficient law enforcement; Value for 
money. 
 
Targets Fair, lawful, proportional and accountable 
surveillance. 
 
LEAs Better tools for recording, retrieving and 
monitoring of criminal activities.  
Better tools and processes for cross-border 
operations and cooperation. 
 
Prosecutors Chain-of- evidence requirements. 
 
Court of law Chain-of-custody requirements. 
 
Legal officers Tools for monitoring-of-legality. 
 
Legislators Commonly agreed balance level between 
surveillance and privacy.  
Identification of the legal barriers to the 
EU-wide deployment of the system of 
interest. 
 
Manufacturers 
and private 
Service 
Providers 
More business opportunities by, e.g., less 
fragmented markets and international 
standards.   
 
Public Service 
Providers 
 
More users of their services providing 
business continuity. 
 
Funding Agency An efficient return on investment ratio. 
The proof-of-concept model designed in this study 
deserves future designed science research (DSR). 
The scope of DSR should be to develop a 
requirement specification and interface specification 
for a complex SIS that integrates crime 
investigation, chain-of-custody and monitoring-of-
legality. Another important DSR/action research 
target is to develop a holistic operational procedure 
from beginning to end that enables the use of the 
new tools for all these three tasks. 
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